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POLICING THE COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES: COMBINING SOLIDARITY
AND SELF-RESPONSIBILITY
Olivier Moreteau

•

I. INTRODUCTION

l . Personal experience sometimes happens to coincide with preexist
ing expertise.

The author of this Article has worked on the topic of com

pensation of victims, of terrorism in particular, 1 and catastrophes in gen
eral, 2 in the context of French law,

and

also

in the framework of

comparative law projects. In August 2005, he left his previous position as
professor of comparative law in Lyon to move with his family to the United
States and, more precisely, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
2. This move was three weeks before Hurricane Katrina, one of the
strongest hurricanes ever recorded on the Atlantic Ocean, made landfall in
South Louisiana. A large shipping container, sheltering most of the family
and household belongings, including a multi-thousand-volume professional
and personal library, happened to be stranded on a railway-track in New Or
leans, where it was flooded and abandoned for more than two months, caus-

*

Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair, Director of the

Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; formerly
Professor of Law, Universite Jean Moulin Lyon 3 and Director of the Edouard Lambert Institute

of Comparative Law. This Article was first published in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007), with the

support of the European Center of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL), together with the Research
Unit for European Tort Law of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The author is grateful to the
ECTIL and the Editors for authorizing a second, updated and expanded publication. Thanks are
also due to Robert A. Pascal for his help on

an

earlier version, and to Chris Hannan, Jeff J. Keiser,

Ellen Overmyer Lloyd, and Agustin Parise for their research and editing.

I. See, e.g.. Olivier Moreteau & Fabien Lafay, Liability for Acts of Terrorism Under French

Law, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 29 (Bernhard A.
Koch ed., 2004).
2. See, e.g. . Olivier Moreteau, Michel Cannarsa & Fabien Lafay, Financial Compensation for
Victims

of

Catastrophes,

France,

in

FINANCIAL

COMPENSATION

FOR

VICTIMS

OF

CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 81 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola

Amodu eds., 2006).
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ing a more than 85% personal loss. Fortunately, the shipment was insured,
compensating at least the loss of the items that had a commercial value.
Leaving personal feelings aside, one legitimately may wonder, in an eco
nomic and legal perspective, whether it makes any difference to the victim
if he has been harmed by the most devastating disaster in United States his
tory or merely an individual accident.
3. Why should we make a distinction? Why have special treatments
for victims of catastrophes? From a human point of view, a death is a death,
whatever the cause; it is a disaster, whether individual or collective.

A

flood or a fire may be gigantic or very local, but individual losses are the
same regardless of the cause. Why should victims of disasters benefit from
compulsory insurance coverage, compensation funds, and other special
schemes?
4. Why help people who choose to live in flood-prone or earthquake
prone areas with reinsurance, to keep the risk insurable where insurance
companies would simply refuse to cover the risk? Why not tell them in
stead that their risks will not be insured unless they move to less dangerous
places? After all, citizens in New Orleans knew the damage from hurri
canes could be serious.
5. Yet, one may look at things from a different perspective and take
into account two series of factors. First, large-scale disasters may result in a
huge cost in human lives: 15,000 people died in Bhopal, India, in 1984 as a
3
consequence of the gas leak at the Union Carbide plant; the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 people in New York and Wash
ington; and the South-Asian tsunami of December 26, 2004 swept away
4
Hurricane Katrina killed at least 1,400, and there
5
were still some 700 missing one year later. Destruction may be extremely
some 230,000 people.

costly, reaching a compound total of 80 billion dollars in the case of
7
6
Katrina, more than 25 billion in the case of Hurricane Andrew in 1992,

3. The Union Carbide plant leaked deadly Methyl Isocyanate gas during the night of Decem

ber 3, 1984. The poisonous gas killed thousands of people in the city and around, and thousands
of people who were injured were still suffering from its effect more than twenty years later. See
Union Carbide Corp., Bhopal Information Ctr., Chronology, available at http://www.bhopal.com /
pdfs/chrono05.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

4. See T. Matthew Ciolek, 2004 Tsunami Disaster-Scholarly and Factual Analyses, ASIAN

STUDIES WWW VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 2005, http://www.ciolek.com/WWWVLPages/AsiaPages/

Tsunami-Analyses.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
5. See La. Dep't of Health & Hospitals, Hurricane Katrina, Deceased Reports, Reports of
Missing

and

Deceased:

August

2,

2006,

http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?

ID= l92&Detail=5248 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
6. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), Fact Sheet: Noteworthy Records of the
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and 1.8 billion euros in Toulouse, France, following the explosion of the
AZF factory.

8

6. Various causes of destruction may be vast and may affect both pri
vate homes and public or collective equipment. They have a high collective
disruptive effect and a huge emotional impact far beyond the affected area.
Additional damage must be taken into account, such as homelessness, lack
or shortage of medical care, shortage of water or food, and often lack of
administration and police protection.

People's lives are changed during

long periods of time, living in temporary shelters years after an earthquake
or, in the United States, in FEMA trailers almost three years after Hurricane
9
Katrina. More than one year after Katrina, many New Orleans' citizens are
still having difficulty accessing normal supplies, education, or employment.

10

7. Second, the consequences of catastrophes, aside from the catastro
phes themselves, are largely man-made, such as terror attacks and industrial
disasters. Conversely, however, some disasters are totally natural, like tsu
namis, hurricanes, or earthquakes. Overall, most catastrophes are a combi
nation of natural forces and human activity, such as the devastation of New
Orleans in 2005. In all, the city fared rather well under the hurricane-force
winds and downpour.

However, the weakness of ill-designed levees and

the absence of gates to shut the canals linking Lake Pontchartrain to the
Mississippi River caused the city to be submerged by the storm surge in the

lake. 11 The same may be said of the oil-spill disasters such as the wrecks of
the Exxon Valdez in 1989, of the Erika in 1999, and of the Prestige in 2002:

2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2005/
s2540b.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

7. Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastro
phes,

United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A

COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303, 342, � 46 n.166 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola

Amodu eds., 2006).
8. As a consequence of the explosion of a chemical plant called AZF (owned by Total Fina
Elf) that was located in Toulouse, France, 30 people died, 5,000 suffered personal injury, and

thousands of private and public buildings were damaged. The scene after the explosion was as if a

large part of suburban Toulouse had been bombed. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note
2, at 81.
9. See, e.g., Becky Bohrer, Assoc. Press, Nagin: Katrina Anniversary Goa/for Getting Rid of

FEMA Trailers, KATC.COM, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://www.katc.com/globaVstory.asp?s
=8022162 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

10. For a current survey of the situation in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, see U.S. Dep't
of Homeland Security, Hurricane Katrina: What Government is Doing?, http://www.dhs.gov/xpre
presp/programs/gc_l 15 7649340100.shtm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

11. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Engineers Faulted on Hu"icane System, N.Y. TIMES July 11,
,

2007, at A013.
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they were all caused by the combined effect of a tempest and human negli
gence.
8. Fatalities and losses in a catastrophe are not simply caused by indi
vidual choices that may lead to ordinary accidents, such as driving a smaller
and less protective car to save on gas, engaging in a dangerous sports activ
ity, or smoking in bed.

Instead, fatalities and losses in a catastrophe are

strongly linked to collective choices, political or economical, and to human
contingencies that may not be ignored in the present context; not everyone
may live on top of Mount Ararat to avoid the consequences of a possible
deluge.

Slopes may be unsafe because of the risk of landslide, and yet

many people may have no better housing option. Unless they settle in un
reasonable places, can we blame people for living in flood-prone plains?
Most agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity develops in plains,
alongside rivers used for irrigation and as waterways.

Coastal ports have

always been a haven for vibrant activity, from fishing to carriage of goods
and passengers. Further, volcanoes fertilize the surrounding land and supply
rich minerals and waters, to the benefit of people who live much further
away.
9. Such choices result in human activity that makes pre-existing natu
ral risks more threatening. For example, moving to Florida to age gracefully
under the sun can increase the damage caused by natural events if crowds of
people pursue the same idea. Further, channeling a huge river such as the
Mississippi between high levees, sometimes made of concrete, may have
the effect of protecting big cities and millions of people.

However, at the

same time, it may also deprive vast plains of necessary alluvia and cause the
Gulf of Mexico's coastal region to be deprived of the barrier of low islands
12

that once protected the New Orleans region against forceful hurricanes.

10. In light of these factors, should we decide upfront the collective
answer to what is a collective problem? For instance, considering that half
of New Orleans' residents did not have flood insurance coverage, should
we blame the victims of this catastrophe for not taking insurance wherever
available.

Just as many citizens of New Orleans were uninsured in the

wake of Katrina, in Toulouse it was found that 15% of the victims of the
13
AZF factory explosion did not have homeowners insurance.

12. This theory was discussed in detail by John M. Barry at a luncheon address for the Cen
tennial celebration of the Louisiana State University (LSU) Law Center on September 15, 2006.
For further information, see JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF
1927 AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (Simon & Schuster 1 997).

13. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 81.
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11. Even if more residents maintained insurance coverage, insurance

providers may nevertheless treat the claimed damages as uninsurable, and
exclude some of the risks associated with an area or activity. This pattern is
especially apparent after insurance companies have been faced with a large
scale disaster, which put a number of insurance companies out of business.
An example of this reaction and outcome occurred in Florida after Hurri
14
cane Andrew in 1992.
12. Beyond individual claims, it is important to recognize that the ef

fects of a catastrophe impact private and public entities alike. For example,
who can deny that the Port of South Louisiana, stretching from New Or
leans to Baton Rouge, is the largest volume shipping port in the Western
1
Who can deny the enor
Hemisphere and the fourth largest in the world?
mous contribution of Louisiana in the supply of oil and gas, to the benefit of
the rest of the American nation? It can be ar �ued that protection of this re

gion should be regarded as a national priority.

6

13. A catastrophe is much more than the sum of individual disasters,

especially when it is large-scale.

Yet, how do we define such disasters?

Scales exist that measure the intensity of an earthquake and the destructive
strength of a hurricane, but there is no general scale to measure catastro
phes. Instead, we are left with the obvious observation that catastrophes af
fect a large number of people at one time and cause long-term disrupting
consequences for the survivors.

And, despite judgment by some after the

fact, for most victims the impact of such catastrophes was unavoidable by
sound individual choice.
14. Does this mean that society should inform potential victims of dis

asters that they may only rely on their individual choices and on the market
forces to prevent, cure, or insure the consequences of catastrophes?

Such

an attitude is predominant in the United States, a society that relies on the
individual and is organized from the bottom up.

Americans often turn to

their local municipality when unable to cope with the effects of a catastro
phe. From there, a municipality may call upon county (or parish if in Lou
isiana) officials, then the state; and only if the state cannot cope may it re
sort to aid from the federal government.

Within such a model, the State

plays a limited regulatory function, ensuring that social and economic ac-

14. For further discussion of the reactions to Hurricane Andrew, see

infra ml 30-31.

15. Port of South Louisiana, Transp. Ctr. of the Americas, Port Overview, http://www.portsl.c
om/pages/I 5_overview.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) ("The Port of South Louisiana, which
stretches 54 miles along the Mississippi River, is the largest tonnage port district ... in the West
ern Hemisphere.").
16. See

BARRY, supra

note 12.
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tors can interact in a legally safe and competitive environment, and inter
venes only in large scale emergencies.
15. Should we expect state authorities to be proactive and to take pre

ventive steps, to organize and regulate the compensation of victims

ex ante?

This is a predominant attitude in many European countries, especially in
17
France, where solidarity matters more than prosperity.
In fact, most
French people seem to believe that too much competition triggers exclu
sion. In times past, the poor and the weak in France used to call on the lord
or the king for protection. After the French Revolution, however, such calls
shifted to the State administration. Today, French society remains organ
ized from the top-down, and the State is expected to care for the people.
Extensive State intervention is not only acceptable; it is constantly re
quested by the people.
16. This Article is not intended to discuss the respective merits of

market economy and regulated economy, nor the respective value of soli
darity as against self-responsibility. Rather, as contended below, both often
coexist in the United States and in France.

France promotes self

responsibility by giving incentives to people to insure their risks. In com
parison, the United States promotes solidarity by giving tax exemptions on
18
money donated to help victims of catastrophes, by creating a fund for the
September 11 victims, 19 and by voting for billions of federal dollars to be
spent on catastrophe victims.20
17. The purpose of this Article is to provide a comparison of the

American and French systems for compensating catastrophe victims. First,
under the American model,

ex ante reliance on individual and market forces
is completed by government intervention and is followed by huge ex post

solidarity. Second, under the French model, preventive efforts openly com
bine the action of individuals, market forces, and State intervention, there
fore limiting public expenditure after the event. The American and French
models are chosen not only due to the fact that they are not totally unknown

17. The Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, referred to in the Preamble to the pre
sent Constitution of 1958, states: "[T]he solidarity and equality of all French people as to the
charge resulting from national calamities." See 1946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (stating at paragraph 12:
"la solidarite et l'egalite de tous Jes Fran�ais devant Jes charges qui resultent des calamites natio
nales").
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agen
cy (FEMA), Tax Relief for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees (No. R4-05-149) (Oct. 5, 2005), available
at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=l9443 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
19. 49 u.s.c. § 40101 (2007).

20. Eric Lipton, Leaders in Congress Agree on Aid for Gulf Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2005, at A529.
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21
to the present contributor and well documented, but also because they are
the most typical in their categories. Thus, each system will be surveyed in
turn.
II. THE AMERICAN MODEL: MAKING COMPENSATION
AVAILABLE

18. The American system relies predominantly on individual and local
action, with obvious downsides when it comes to the management of large
scale disasters. Examples of incentives will be given, showing that at both
the federal and state levels, efforts are made to make compensation avail
able, usually by way of private insurance. Despite such measures, however,
even in the United States, the government has become a major player in ca
tastrophe compensation.
A. THE DOWNSIDE OF RELIANCE ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND ON LOCAL
AUTHORITIES

19. The American system attempts to focus on providing compensa
tion for catastrophe victims and increasing accessibility of catastrophe cov
erage for all individuals who are in need of such protection. The American
social welfare system is underdeveloped in comparison to most European
countries.

Further, the role of tort law is predominant, not only as a gap

filler where no other recourse is available, but also because the American
mindset is that only the tortfeasor should have to pay. While a Frenchman
requests public help, an American searches for a tortfeasor to hold respon
sible for damages.
20. This reliance on bringing suit to require a tortfeasor to pay dam

ages serves not only a personal, but a public policy function that helps to
keep American society safe.

In theory, this plaintiff-friendly procedural

system increases the ease of accessing justice. The indigent victim having a
good cause of action is expected to find a lawyer willing to be paid on a
contingency fee basis. Damages are assessed by juries comprised of ordi
nary citizens, who often easily identify and sympathize with the victim.
Thus, damages are likely to be high. Even after deducting 30% for attorne
�
fees, 22 the victim is generously compensated. Class actions are favored 3

21. See Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7.
22.

In the "standard" contemporary contingency fee arrangement, the lawyer collects roughly

a third of his or her client's recovery in the case, although this standard rule has many variations

and exceptions. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency

Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 757-61 (2002).

23. See Linda S. Mullenix, Developments in the Procedural Means for Resolution of Mass
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and punitive damages are allowed; each serving the same policing function
and assistance towards eliminating noxious activities. In essence, a clear
incentive to litigate exists, even when insurance coverage does not.
21. The trouble with natural disasters is that no recourse to tort law
suits is available in a large number of instances.

Yet, as suggested above,

many natural disasters are also man-made. For instance, the New Orleans'
24
victims of Hurricane Katrina have identified the Army Corps of Engineers
as a possible defendant in a potentially large class action suit, such as the
25
Some obvious mistakes in the conception of
one filed on July 12, 2006.
the levee system, a system for which the Corps of Engineers was responsi
26
These mistakes have been pointed to as
ble, have been demonstrated.
largely explaining the failure that cost so many lives and massive destruc
27
tion by the effect of prolonged tlooding.
22. On January 30, 2008, the United States District Court for the East
ern District of Louisiana dismissed the consolidated class action against the
Corps of Engineers, but not without an at least implicit recognition of the
28
Corps' role in the catastrophe. In this opinion, Judge Duval stated:
While the United States government is immune for legal liability for
the defalcations alleged herein, it is not free, nor should it be, from
posterity's judgment concerning its failure to accomplish what was its
task....

The cruel irony here is that the Corps cast a blind eye, either as a result

Tort

Litigation

in

the

United States,

in TERRORISM,

TORT

LAW

AND

INSURANCE:

A

COMPARATIVE SURVEY 204 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004).

24. The United States Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering services to the United
States, both for military and civil purposes. See U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, Who We Are,
http://www.usace.army.mil/who/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

The agency's responsibilities in

clude the levees that are intended to protect New Orleans from flooding.
25. See Charles Savoy v. United States, No. 06-3552, (E.D. La. filed July 12, 2006). See also
McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, Hurricane Law Blog: News and Opinion from the Recovery in the
Gulf States, MR-GO Class Action Against Corps of Engineers, http://www.hurricanelawblog.
corn/archives/la-litigation-actions-filed-mrgo-class-action-against-corps-of-engineers.html

(Jul y

18, 2006) (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
26. See IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE STORM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA-THE INSIDE STORY FROM ONE LOUISIANA SCIENTIST 211-49

(2006).
27. See id.
28. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 643 (E.D. La.
2008),

available

at

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20080 l 30_Dismissal_

Order.pdf (last visited March 26, 2008).
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of executive directives or bureaucratic parsimony, to flooding caused
by drainage needs and until otherwise directed by Congress, solely fo
cused on flooding caused by storm surge. Nonetheless, damage caused
by either type of flooding is ultimately borne by the same public fisc.
Such egregious myopia is a caricature of bureaucratic inefficiency.
It is not within this Court's power to address the wrongs committed. It
is hopefully within the citizens of the United States' power to address
the failures of our laws and agencies. If not, it is certain that another
29
tragedy such as this will occur again.

23. Alternatives to the courts for catastrophe victims are private or
public insurance or public disaster relief programs, such as those adminis30
tered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
To access FEMA aid, the governor of the state in which the disaster occurred
must declare a state of emergency and formally request from the President
of the United States that FEMA and the Federal government respond to the
31
disaster.
Unfortunately, the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew that swe t
2
through South Florida proved that this system was not reactive enough.

�

The primary issue with this system is that it requires foresight by local au
thorities at an early stage to assess whether the anticipated effects of the
disaster will exceed their management capacity.

The flaw in this scheme

became glaringly apparent during Hurricane Katrina, when both the Mayor
of New Orleans and the Governor of Louisiana failed to call early enough
33
for federal help.
While the American federal system works very satisfac
torily to stimulate competition and profit, the response to Hurricane Katrina
34
As a

shows that it may not be all that fit to respond national emergencies.

29. See

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 643.

30. FEMA was created in 1979 under President Carter to coordinate the response to a disaster
occurring in the United States and overwhelming the resources of local and state authorities.

It

operated as an independent agency until the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
2003 as a response by President George W. Bush to the September 11 terrorist attacks. For further
information on the role of FEMA and its interaction with federal and state government, see Rabin
& Bratis, supra note 7, ,, 13-25.

31. 42. U.S.C. § 5170 (2007) ("All requests for a declaration by the President that a major
disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State.").
32. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, iMf 46-54.

33. See, e.g., Editorial, Bob Williams, Blame Amid the Tragedy: Gov. Blanco and Mayor
Nagin Failed Their Constituents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7 2005, at A28.
34. See The Becker-Posner Blog: A Blog by Gary Becker and Richard Posner, Federalism,
Economics, and Katrina-Richard Posner, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/IO/
federalism_econ.html (Oct. 9, 2005, 19:30 CST) (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). Concluding that:
(W)hile state and local government can and should be given exclusive responsibility for re
sponding to run-of-the-mill local emergencies, the federal government should have standby
responsibility for regional and (of course) national emergencies, as well as for emergencies
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result of this maladministration, FEMA reacted in an untimely manner,
which left New Orleans residents in an unacceptable state of distress and
increased the number of fatalities. The Administrator of FEMA was forced
to resign over such issues, and it remains to be seen if the excuses provided
by the President of the United States will fix the problem. Several class ac
tions were filed against FEMA shortly after the event. 35

24. There is no intent to investigate the public insurance schemes in

the present Article. Such a topic is all too complex and patchwork-like and
6
has already been documented in the context of catastrophes.3 While public
schemes may provide relief in cases of individual accidents, such as disabil
ity and unemployment, it is well known that the public welfare system is
underdeveloped in the United States. Instead, much reliance is placed on
private insurance to protect people from the contingencies of life, with sub
stantial government incentives to make coverage possible and available.
8. RELIANCE ON INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES

25. When it comes to private insurance coverage, there are a greater

number of options. Private insurance may cover personal injury in the form
of life, health, and disability insurance. It also may cover damage to prop
erty in the form of homeowner insurance and commercial casualty insur
ance. In general, these policies cover all risks, regardless of the cause of the
loss. However, recent events have revealed gaps in commercial insurance
coverage due to resistance by private insurers to cover damages related to
disasters.37 In response, governmental regulations, both at the federal and
state level, have been enacted to increase the availability of private insur
ance coverage for disasters. Examples of such incentives, both at federal
and state level, can be supplied in sufficient numbers to prove that this is
not an exceptional practice.

26. One such federal example is the Price-Anderson Act, passed· in

that, as in the case of the flooding of New Orleans as a result of Katrina, wreak destruction
on a scale that it would not have been efficient for the local government to prepare to meet.

Id.
35. See, e.g., Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quaran
tines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 121 (2007) (citing Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform
Now v. FEMA, 463 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding a denial of due process guarantees
from FEMA to hurricane evacuees); McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-26 (E.D. La.
2005) (finding violations of constitutional rights and relief statutes)).
36. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, ,, 6-12.
37. See, e.g., Peter G. Gosselin, Insurers Learn to Pinpoint Risks-and Avoid Them, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at A 1.
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8
1957 by Congress, 3 with the express purpose of encouraging private devel
opment of nuclear energy in the United States.

The Act created a mixed

system: a compulsory private insurance coverage scheme combined with an
emergency compensation fund.

A cap was placed on the total amount of

liability that each reactor operator would have to face in the event of a nu
clear accident. 39 Participation in this program is compulsory for all nuclear
0
reactor operators. 4
The intent of this act was purely proactive. In fact,
when the Act was first passed, no tragedy had yet occurred; the act's pas

sage was long before the meltdown at Three Mile Island (1979)41 and the
tragedy of Chernobyl (1986). 42 Despite the proactive stance of this legisla
tion, the threat of ruinous tort litigation was a barrier to private investment

in this new promising industry.43

27. The most striking example of a large
ever, is the National Flood Insurance Program.

2' proactive incentive, how
Administered by FEMA,

the program was established in 1968 in response to the private insurance
industry's reluctance to sell flood coverage. Although the chance of flood
ing is geographically limited with the pool of potential purchasers of flood
insurance, which is restricted to people living in floodplain areas, only peo
ple with less desirable risks and higher potential losses are likely to insure.
Given this small pool of interested buyers, it is difficult for the insurance
45
As a result, Congress
providers to spread the risk in a satisfactory way.
intended the National Flood Insurance Program to ensure availability of
flood

insurance where needed,

while encouraging disaster mitigation
46

through incentives to restrict development on flood-prone lands.

28. Specific details of the National Flood Insurance program include:
( 1) the program is voluntary; (2) communities that choose to participate
must implement land management and practices in compliance with federal

38. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 22 10 (2006).
39. See id.§§ 22JO(e)( l )-(7).

40. For further discussion, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, � 28.
41. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Fact Sheet: Three Mile Island Accident
(2007), a\•ailab/e at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008).
42. See World Nuclear Ass'n, Chernobyl Accident, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/cher
nobyl/inf07 .htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
43. For a detailed history of the successes and failures of the Price-Anderson Act, see Dan N.
Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legis/ation?-The Sixty-Three Mi//ion Dol
lar Question, 1 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. I (1989).
44. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 400 1 - 1 29 (2006).
45. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, � 33-34.
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 400 l (d)-(e).
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guidelines; (3) eligibility for national flood insurance is limited to residents
of participating communities; (4) residents are generally free to purchase
insurance or not, but insurance is mandatory in some cases;47 and (5) federal
agencies are barred from providing flood-related disaster assistance loans or
grants to property located within identified hazard areas unless the commu
nity is participating in the program. 48 Moreover, the federal government as
sumes the role of primary insurer by covering the risk of financial loss as
sociated with a disastrous flood under the flood insurance scheme. Private
insurers collect premiums and settle all claims, but if the losses stemming
from a flood event exceed the premiums collected by the private insurer, the
government steps in and compensates the insured for losses in excess.49 As
noted by Robert Rabin and Suzanne Bratis:

Since the program was started in 1969, it has paid $11. 9 billion in
claims.

In the absence of the Program, this cost would have been

borne by the taxpayers through federal disaster assistance funding or
by the victims individually.

In addition, by requiring communities to

comply with FEMA floodplain management standards as a condition

of participation, FEMA estimates that the program saves $1 billion per

. avot'ded d amages. 50
year m

This program shows how much State intervention aimed at prevention
can protect those who need and deserve it, while saving money for every
one-since solidarity always comes into play ex post facto, in a costly and
less effective manner on account of the collective emotion caused by disas
ters.
29. Another more recent example arose as a reaction to the terrorist at
51
tacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

Shortly after the event, a Victim Compensation Fund was created to provide
prompt and fair compensation to the victims of the attacks and their fami-

47. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, � 33.
48. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 4106.

49. For a general description of the National Flood Insurance Program administered by
FEMA, see FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM;
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: AUGUST 1, 2002 22-29 (2002), available at http://www .fema.gov/librar

y/file?type=publ ish edF ile&file=nfipdescrip_ l _.pdf& fileid==e6fdab40-80bd-11db-9aa6000bdba87
d5b (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
50. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 332, � 34.
51. See Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7,

mf

29-30; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for

Acts of Terrorism Under U.S. law, in TERRORISM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE
SURVEY 176 (Bernhard A. Koch ed., 2004); Kevin P. Hilliard, Civil Litigation Arising out of the

WTC Attacks, in TERRORJSM, TORT LAW AND INSURANCE: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 189 (Bern
hard A. Koch ed., 2004).
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lies, in order to address injury and fatality claims that totaled nearly $7 bil
52
Insurance companies were called to pay huge amounts. By October

lion.

2003, they had received more than 35,000 claims (including personal proIJ
erty and business interruption claims) representing a total of $19 billion.

53

This raised concerns as to the solvency of the American insurance industry.

In response to such concerns, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 200i4

was passed to provide a cap on the losses for which the private insurance
industry will be responsible in the event of a major act of terrorism. Under
this act, the federal government assumes the role of excess liability insurer,

beyond a threshold of $5 million per event that qualifies as an "act of terror

ism,'' to cover 90% of the losses in excess within a $100 billion annual ag. 55
gregate 1.1m1t.

30. Other examples of incentives can be found at the state level. The
existence of such programs demonstrates that the government has become a
major player in reacting to major disasters and preventing problems. for the
future. For example, consider the state of Florida, struck in August 1992 by

Hurricane Andrew. Until then, Hurricane Hugo of 1989 ranked as the cost

liest tropical storm in terms of insured damages. In fact, as noted by Rabin

and Bratis: "The insurance industry used the $4 billion of insured losses
56
This baseline,
caused by Hugo as a basis for assessing their future risks."
however, was rendered obsolete by the $17 billion of insured losses caused

by Hurricane Andrew.

31. After Andrew, a number of small insurers went bankrupt and
many companies moved to stop covering hurricane-related losses.

57

Rein

surers also sought to limit coverage and raised both premiums and deducti
58
ble rates.
To address the inability of its residents' to obtain hurricane in
surance coverage, the government of Florida forced private insurers to
continue offering hurricane coverage at affordable rates.

Moreover, the

state created the Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting As-

52. Peter

Woodin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, in TERRORISM,
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 197 (Bernhard A Koch ed., 2004). See
also Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, iMJ 29, 38-45.
H.

TORT LAW AND INSURANCE:

53.
54.
fied as
55.

Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 'If 29.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322 (codiamended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)).
For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 'If 30.

56. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 333, 'If 36.
57. See Mireya Navarro, Storms Expose Florida's Vulnerability, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at
Al2.
58. Rabin

& Bratis, supra

note 7, 'If 36.
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sociation, which became the second largest insurer in Florida.59

32. California offers another interesting example of government inter
vention. In 1994, the Northridge earthquake caused more than $15 billion
in insured losses, causing many insurers to move out of the business, much
60
as they did in Florida after Hurricane Andrew. The state tried to find solu
tions to protect the citizens against earthquake-related losses, while simul
taneously protecting the state's insurance industry. As a result, the Califor
6
nia Earthqua�e Authority (CEA) was created in 1 99 6. 1 Under a somewhat
62
complicated scheme, private insurers that sell "residential property insur
6
ance" 3 in California are allowed to exclude earthquake-related losses from
their standard coverage, but are required to offer earthquake insurance in
some form. Wherever they do not cover the risk, they must notify the cus
64
tomer and must make an offer of an independent policy for such coverage.
The customer is free to accept or decline the limited coverage: there is no
requirement to carry earthquake coverage. Where provided, however, cov
6
erage must comply with CEA regulations. 5 Interestingly, it has been noted
that "[m]ost residential property insurers-those comprising about 80% of
the market, including the largest homeowners' insurers in the state-have
chosen to opt out of providing coverage themselves, and instead simply
administer policy coverage for the CEA, which assumes primary risk
66
bearing responsibility." In short, under this system, private insurers play a
purely administrative role while the CEA assumes the financial risk.
33. Specifically, the CEA is a privately financed entity, composed of
insurance companies licensed to do business in California and governed by
59. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, ii 36.

60. Rabin & Gratis, supra note 6, ii 31.

61. CAL. INS. CODE§ 10089.6(a) (West 2008) ("The authority shall be authorized to transact

insurance in this state as necessary to sell policies of basic residential earthquake insurance .... )
"

62. For further information, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, iii! 31-32.

63. Residential property insurance is defined as:
[A] policy of residential property insurance shall mean a policy insuring individually owned
residential structures of not more than four dwelling units, individually owned condominium
units, or individually owned mobile homes, and their contents, located in this state and used
exclusively for residential purposes or a tenant's policy insuring personal contents of a resi
dential unit located in this state. Policy of residential property insurance, as defined, shall not
include insurance for real property or its contents used for any commercial industrial or
business purpose, except a structure of not more than four dwelling units rent d for individ
ual residential purposes. A policy that does not include any of the perils insured against in a
�tandard fire policy shall not be included in the definition of "policy of residential property

�

insurance.

CAL. INS. CODE§ 10087(a) (West 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See id. § 10087.5.
65. See id. § 10089 (establishing minimum coverage and maximum deductibles permitted).
66. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 328, ii 31.

.
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a three-member board of state officials including the Governor, the State
67
Participating insurers

Treasurer, and the State Insurance Commissioner.

(with mandatory contributions to create the initial operating capital), rein
surance, and the premiums charged for policies sold all contribute toward
funding the CEA. 68 The Board is charged with ensuring that the CEA has
sufficient capital to maintain operations, because there is no state liability to
69
It has been ob

pay claims that would exceed the CEA ' s capability to pay.

served that "by establishing a ceiling on the mandated contributions from
private insurers, and pooling these risks, the CEA represents a model under
which the state has relieved the private insurers of the uncertainty and po
70
all
tentially catastrophic losses associated with a maj or earthquake,"
within a system where the state does not pay. However, it should be noted
that this does not exclude private intervention, where under a similar strat
egy, "major commercial insurance brokers have created pools of private in
71
Despite the
surers to offer coverage on large commercial properties."
continuing presence of private insurers, the above examples clearly demon
strate that in the United States, the government has become a major player
in disaster coverage.
C. THE GOVERNMENT HAS BECOME A MAJOR PLAYER
34. Not only in reaction to disasters, such as terrorism, hurricanes, and

earthquakes, but also as a proactive measure to potential disasters from in
cidents like nuclear accidents or flooding, the government has become a
major player in disaster recovery.

In this role, the government works to

prevent the withdrawal of private insurance in entire areas and ensure there
is sufficient private or public funding to cover major risks.
ment intervention takes place both at federal and state levels.
grams often go beyond making private insurance available.

This govern
These pro
In fact, such

programs pool the risks and sometimes inject substantial public funding,
such as in the case of terrorism and the National Flood Insurance Program.
Thus, currently in the United States, there exists a palpable shift from pri
vate coverage to public funding.
35. Some may complain that governmental intervention is a bad thing.

One objection is that such intervention distorts the insurance market, caus
ing insurance prices and availability to no longer reflect the risk level of the

67. CAL. INS. CODE
68. Id. §

§ 10089.7 (West 2008).

1 0089. 15.

69. For futher infonnation, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, 1[

70. Rabin & Bratis, supra note
71.

7, at 330, 1[ 32.
Rabin & Bratis, supra note 7, at 330, 1[ 32.

32.
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activity.

72

The Florida post-Andrew reaction gives a most interesting an

swer to this obj ection.

Proponents of government intervention point out

that the state is in a better position than private insurers to bear risks that the
private sector no longer wants to assume, because the state has broader re
sources and a larger borrowing capacity. Further, it has been noted that "by
using regulations to force insurance coverage and premium rates that are
out of step with the actuarial assessment of the private insurers, the gov
ernment creates a market in which private insurers are unable to compete,
73
In the end, there is no market-distortion,
even if they wanted to re-enter."
but rather a new market emerges, where the private sector may remain free
to intervene, subject to compliance with some rules, such as those seen in
the above example of California.
36. Another familiar obj ection is that "government intervention forces
74
the public at large to subsidize the risky lifestyle of a segment of society."
There is little doubt that this is a sound argument when addressing the cov
erage of highly risky individual action totally based on personal choice,
such as high mountain climbing with light equipment or riding a motorcycle
75
However, disasters are likely to happen in
wearing shorts and t-shirts.
heavily populated areas where large numbers of people are making a sig
nificant economic contribution to the general welfare while also benefiting
those living in less risk-prone places. As pointed out in the introduction to
76
this Article, no society would be viable if all its members tried to take ref
77
uge and prosper in the least risky areas.
In addition, due to the global
wanning phenomenon, it becomes difficult to find reasonably safe places
anywhere on our planet and impossible to move millions (if not billions) of
people there, which would inevitably generate huge costs and unknown

72. Roger van den Bergh, Compulsory Catastrophe Extension of First Party Insurance from a
Competition Policy Perspective, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES:
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 361 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief

&

Tola Amodu eds.,

2006).
73. Rabin
74. Rabin

& Bratis, supra note 7, at 334, ii 36.
& Bratis, supra note 7, at 334, ii 36.

75. See Olivier Moreteau, More Personal Responsibility, in TOPICS: PHARMACEUTICAL
RISKS, EMERGING RISKS, US TORT LAW 12 (Miinchener Ruck Munich Re Group 2005), available

at http://www.munichre.de/publications/302-0464 1_en.pdf(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
76. See supra ii I 0.
77. Politicians also call to emotion and imagination, like President George W. Bush in his
speech at Jackson Square, in New Orleans, a few days after hurricane Katrina: "And all who ques
tion the future of the Crescent City need to know there is no way to imagine America without
New Orleans, and this great city will rise again." See President George W. Bush, Address at Jack
son Square, New Orleans, La.: President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation
(Sept. 1 5 , 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/200509 1 58.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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risks.

3 7 . Sol idarity is vital,

7s

and so is self-responsibility. Both are not con

flicting values, but at all times complementary, essential social values. The
U.S. National Flood Insurance Program shows how the two can be intelli
gently combined in modem policy.

In comparison, the French model,

which is heavily based on state regulation and the promotion of solidarity,
similarly shows how the compensation of the victims of catastrophes can be
based on a careful combination of collective solidarity and individual self
responsibility.
III. THE FRENCH MODEL: REGULATING COMPENSATION

3 8 . France regards itself as a welfare state. Solidarity is a constitu
79
so
Ad
tional value, as it is in Italy and in some other European countries.
mittedly, the French way may have its downsides, for instance when it re
duces

authoritatively the working time to thirty-five hours a week,

supposedly to promote the creation of new jobs, but thereby putting so
many small businesses in a precarious situation that existing jobs are jeop
s
1 Likewise, French law looks as if it generously protects employ

ardized.

ees through increased job protection by making it difficult to dismiss em
ployees.

Yet, in so doing, the French system makes the job market less

accessible for the unemployed.

39. Regarding the victims of disasters, actual or potential, solidarity is
clearly promoted in France.

In fact, the Preamble of the French Constitu

tion affirms "the solidarity and equality of all French people as to the
s2
charge resulting from national calamities."
Thus, government policy takes
care not only of the consequences of death and personal inj ury, but also of
the compensation for damage to property.

Yet, clear incentives are also

given to preventive measures, promoting self-responsibility.

Despite these

benefits, the "French exception" admittedly has had associated costs, like
1 5,000 elderly people dying as a consequence of the formidable heat wave

7 8 . And it is primarily private, as seen after every catastrophe.
79. See 1 946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.).
80. See Alberto Monti & Filippo Andrea Chiaves, Financial Compensation for Victims of Ca

tastrophes,

Italy,

in

FINANCIAL

COMPENSATION

COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 145,

ii

FOR

VICTIMS

OF

CATASTROPHES:

A

3 (Michael Faure, Ton Hartlief & Tola Amodu eds.,

2006); see generally STEINAR STJERN0, SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
8 1 . See Philip Delves Broughton, French 35-Hour Week "a Disaster,
(LONDON), May 1 8, 2004, § News, at 14.
82. See 1 946 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.).

"
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during the summer of 2003 .83 This disaster triggered a national debate and

political action as to the fate of elderly people in a post-industrial society.
A. DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURY

40. Victims will always benefit from the French social security sys

tem, covering most medical expenses in case of personal injury. This sys
tem, known as the

Securite sociale, is open to all and accessible regardless

of the origin of the damage. However, compensation is minimal in the case
of death and permanent disability, which creates an incentive to rely on tort
4
suits for adequate compensation, 8 unless the victim or the dependants may
rely on the new insurance coverage for accidents of private life that was
proposed in the year 2000.
4 1 . Under the name

garantie accidents de la vie (literally, "guarantee

against life accidents"), insurance companies offer almost full coverage of

the consequences of death (for the dependants) or physical injury when

such damage occurs in the course of private life, whether at home or out
side.8 5 The cost is minimal, starting as low as € 1 5 per month for full family
6
coverage. 8 The covered damage may be the consequence of a natural or

technological catastrophe, a terrorist attack, or a medical risk, as long as
some outside event caused the accident.8 7 The compensation is usually lim
ited to a maximum amount of €1 million.88 It also covers the compensation

of economic loss, loss of amenity and pain and suffering.89
42. The

garantie accidents de la vie is almost a novelty in France .

Two major mutual insurance companies offered similar and yet not as ex
tended coverage in the past.9 0 It is unprecedented in Europe, in the sense

83. See Thomas Crampton, Record Heat Wilts Europe, Strains Power Supply and Hurts
July 27, 2006, at A l .
84. For further infonnation, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ,, 5 , 12-17.
85. See BUREAU OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITIEE ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION, REPORT ON
INDEMNJFJYING VICTIMS OF TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY FOR THE EUROPEAN
COMMITIEE ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION 1 1- 1 3 (November 27, 2006) available at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/steering_committees/cdcj/cj-s-vict/CDCJ
BU%20(2006)%20 l 9%20e%20-%20ECTIL%20Report.pdf (last visited March 26, 2008).
86. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, , 6 .
Crops, N.Y. TIMES,

87. See The French GA V® Accident Compensation, SCOR TECHNICAL NEWSL. (SCOR
Group, Paris, France), Oct. 2003, at 2, available at http://www .scor.com/www/fileadmin/uploads/
publics/NTNV2003_05_en_tuknv05.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. For an exhaustive history of the insurance industry in France, see Bertrand Venard, The
French Insurance Market: Background and Trends,

in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

INSURANCE: BETWEEN GLOBAL DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES

24 1 -96 (J. David
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that it provides full coverage, as in a case of tort liability, and it also covers
non-pecuniary damages. Instead of relying on the Welfare State, people are
offered an affordable option geared at protecting them against the harsh
consequences of daily life or less foreseeable accidents. In that sense, self
responsibility is promoted.
43. French tort law may be described as victim friendly, yet restrictive
in terms of victim compensation. Among its benefits, the system is easily
accessible with access such as legal aid to help the indigent.

In addition,

the cost of j ustice is much lower in France than in the United States and
91
other common law countries. For those relying on the tort system, which
may be possible only where a potentially liable party is identified, strict li
ability may be more generously available than in other legal systems where
caps may exist that limit the amount of damages to be awarded. One down
side, however, is that French courts are not generous in awarding damages,
especially the administrative courts hearing disputes where the defendant is
92
In addition, like most civil law jurisdic
93
tions, the French system does not allow class actions.
a government or public authority.

44. Examples may be found where public authorities have been made
liable for damage caused by a natural disaster.

For instance, after the

Grand-Bomans flooding, that killed twenty-three people in the Alps in the
summer of 1 987 and caused significant property damage, the State and lo
cal authorities were made jointly liable and had to pay compensation to the

victims or their families; the State for lack of care in authorizing the devel
opment of a camping ground in an area likely to be flooded by the mountain
torrent, and the local authorities for failure to warn of the possible dangers. 94
4 5 . These possibilities for victim compensation are not limited to
cases of catastrophes. However, the only disaster specific scheme to cover
the consequences of death and personal injury is the Compensation Fund

2007).
9 1 . For further information, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 'IM! 30-38.
92. For a current survey and criticism of the standards governing recovery of damages in
French tort law, see David Corbe-Chalon & Martin A. Rogoff, Tort Reform A La Francaise:
Jurisprndential and Policy Perspectives on Damages for Bodily Injury in France, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 23 1 (2007).
93. For a discussion of the current debate in France and throughout the European Union on
introducing the procedural mechanism of the class action, see Gary L. Gassman & Perry S. Gran
off, Global Issues Affecting Securities Claims at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 43
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2007).
94. [CAA] (Administrative Court of Appeal), Lyon, 1 3 May 1 997, Droit admnistrat(f (Dr.
adm.) July 1 997, 7; Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 37.
Cummins & Bertrand Venard eds.,
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The Compensation Fund for the victims of ter
96
in response to a num

rorist action and other offenses was created in 1 9 86

ber of terrorist attacks in the early and mid- 1 980s. It is funded by a levy on
the insurance premiums paid for the coverage of damage to property, such
as automobile or homeowner insurance. An additional €3 .30 is paid per
97
It covers all French citizens who are a victim of a terrorist attack
contract.
in France or abroad, in addition to all foreign victims of terrorist attacks oc
curring in French territories, even in cases where the terrorists have been
98
identified and prosecuted.
This is further evidence of a solidarity policy.
46. The Fund offers full compensation for personal inj ury, and addi
tionally, compensation for pain and suffering and consequential loss not re
99
lated to property.
Compensated victims are granted the status of victim of
100
war, with all the rights and benefits inherent to such status.
This includes
totally free medical care (a share of which is otherwise supported by bene
fits a patient may receive from Securite sociale) and the benefit of a pen
101
sion, in addition to compensation.
In case of death, the dependants are
102
compensated for their economic loss.
47. Additionally, the system provides victims with full compensation
within just a few weeks, without complex and lengthy proceedings. There
is a ten-year period for filing a claim or applying for additional compensa
tion. The offer of compensation must be made within three months follow-

95 . Moreteau & Lafay, supra note 1, �� 6- 1 5 ; Moreteau, Cannarsa, & Lafay, supra note 2,
ii 29.
96. Law No. 86- 1 020 of Sept. 9, 1 986 (art. 9), Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran9aise
(J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Sept. 10, 1 986, p. 1 0956 (amended by Law No. 87-1 060 of
Dec. 30, 1 987 and Law No. 90-589 of July 6, 1 990 (art. 2), Journal Officiel de la Republique
Fran9aise [J.0.] [Official Gazette of France), July 1 1 , 1 990).
97. The amount is fixed annually by government decision. See C. INS. art. L422-4, ii I , avail
able at http:/1 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c= 38&r-6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

In 2008, the contribution is fixed at €3.30 per contract. See S.O.S. Attentats, Aide aux victims:
Indemnisation, http://www .sos-attentats.org/aide-victimes-indernnisation.asp?lan_id=fr (last vis
ited Mar. 28, 2008).
98. C. INS. art. L422- l , available at http:// 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r=6
398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). See also Fonds de Garantie (FOTI), Guarantee Fund for Victims
of Acts of Terror and Other Offences, Conditions for Making a Claim to the FGTI: Acts of Terror
ism, http://www.fgti.fr/anglais/terro/condition.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
99. C. INS. art. L422- l , ii I, available at http:// l 95.83. l 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=3 8 &
r-6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 00. Law No. 90-86 ofJan. 23, 1 990 (art. 26), Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Franyaise
[J.0.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 25, 1 990.
1 0 1 . Moreteau & Lafay, supra note I , ii 1 5 .
1 02 . C . INS. art. L422-2, ii 3 , available a t http :// l 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=
38&r-6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

2008]

85

Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes

ing the filing of the claim.

1 03

Acceptance of the offer by the victim or the

dependants subrogates the Fund in the claimant' s rights for the amount
104
However, it does not bar the victim from obtaining additional com
105
pensation in a tort action.
Apart from damage to or loss of clothing, the

paid.

Compensation Fund does not cover damage to property.
B. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
48. French law operates on the assumption that most citizens subscribe
to first party insurance to cover possible damage to their property.
ever, homeowner insurance is not compulsory.

How

Recent catastrophes re

vealed that approximately up to 15% of victims of major disasters do not
106
Yet, most people living in rented premises are re
carry such insurance.
quested by the lessor to subscribe to insurance coverage called

multirisque

habitation, which covers most risks to the building, its contents, and the
consequences of tortious acts committed by the insured or his dependants.
Moreover, it is common practice for a landlord to request the prospective
tenant to give evidence of such insurance before signing the lease. Private
house and apartment owners also purchase such insurance, especially where
the property is mortgaged. In fact, commercial lenders always request evi
dence of such insurance.
49. Under such policies, including first pa
0
sured value of the car and property left in it, 1

car insurance for the in

Winsurance companies

bound by law to insure damages resulting from natural catastrophes.

108

are
The

Insurance Code gives the following definition for natural catastrophes:
Non insurable direct material damage whose determining cause was
the abnormal intensity of a natural agent, when normal measures to be
taken to protect against such damage have been unable to prevent the
occurrence thereof or could not be taken, shall be deemed to be natural

1 03. C. INS. art. L422- l , ii 3, available at http:// l 95.83. l 77. 9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=
38&r=6398 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 04. Id.
1 05 . Moreteau & Lafay, supra note l, iJiJ 1 6-20 (discussing Cour de cassation, Chambre crimi
nelle [Cass. Crim.] [court of cassation] Paris, Oct. 20,

1 993,

1 994,

D. 280, note Anne

d' Hauteville).
1 06. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ii 8 1 .
I07. Third party car insurance is compulsory. In addition, a person may subscribe to first party
insurance to cover damage caused to their car and property transported in the car.
1 08. See Law No. 82-600 of July 1 3 , 1 982, Journal Officiel de la Republique Fram;:aise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1 992, p. 1 87 (relating to the compensation of victims of natu

ral catastrophes which are presently codified at C. INS. arts. L 1 25-l to -6). See also Moreteau,
Cannarsa, & Lafay, supra note 2, ii 1 9.
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.
the meamng of th'ts chapter. 0

The catastrophe must be an abnormal phenomenon, a natural one not pro

voked by human activity. It must also be of exceptional intensity or dura

tion.

For instance, continuous rain is not considered exceptional, but may

become so if it lasts for a very long period. An unusual change in the eco

system may also qualify. Lastly, it should be unavoidable, in the sense that

the consequences may not be evaded by the taking of normal care. 1 1 0 As
the Code puts it, the damage must be "non insurable." 1 1 1

However, where

an exceptional risk (one of those traditionally excluded before the creation

of the compulsory system) is nonetheless covered by insurance, the more
favorable coverage will of course apply.

50. Another feature that appears in legal literature (though not ex

pressly in the above-mentioned statutory definition) is that the disaster
should be perceived as intolerable, in such a way that collective conscious
ness compels it to be described as a natural catastrophe. 1 1 2 Floods, land
slides, snowfalls, and droughts usually qualify.

Tempests are usually cov

ered by insurance but, as explained below, today they qualify when of

outstanding magnitude. 1 13
.
1 J4
fiorce ma1eure.

In short, the catastrophe may be compared to

5 1 . Victims may be compensated for the consequences of such risks

under the compulsory scheme only where the Government recognizes and
declares that there is a "natural catastrophe." 1 1 5 This is done by way of ad

ministrative order, stating the geographic zone and times affected by the

natural catastrophe and the nature of the damages to be covered by the in
surance. 1 1 6 This causes victims and local authorities to put the state gov

ernment under pressure every time a disaster happens. Ministers, and even

the President of the Republic, will promptly appear on the scene and prom

ise an immediate declaration, so that the victims may be quickly compen

sated.

109. C. INS. art. L l25- l , � 3, available at http:/1195.83 . 177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=
38&r=6260 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 10. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 19.
1 1 1 . C. INS. art. L l25- l , � 3, available at http:/1 195.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=
38&r=6260 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 12. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 19.
1 1 3 . Moreteau, Cannarsa, & Lafay, supra note 2, � 19.
1 14. Premiere chambre civile de la Cour de Cassation [Cass. l e civ.] [first civil court of the
court of appeal] Paris, July 7, 1998, RODA 1 998, 841 , note Vincent.
1 15. C. INS. art. L l25- 1 , � 4, available at http:/11 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=
38&r=6260 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 16. C. INS. art. L l 25-l , § 4 (as amended by Law No. 95-665 of July 1 6, 1992).
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52. Where no declaration of "natural catastrophe" is made, the insured
may benefit only from coverage of the risks expressly covered under the in
surance policy.

In 1990, compulsory coverage was extended to damages

caused by tempests, hurricanes, and cyclones for every policy covering the

risk of fire. 1 1 7 There is no specific provision regarding floods. This means
that damage caused by flooding may only be covered by the effect of an ex
press stipulation in the contract or, failing express coverage, if the devastat
ing event has been declared "natural catastrophe."
5 3 . It should be noted that compulsory coverage for damage to prop
erty is not limited to natural disasters. Instead, it is also extended to man
made catastrophes.

For instance, insured victims of damage to property

caused by terrorist attacks or bombing perpetrated on the French territory
will benefit from full insurance coverage. Indeed, article L I 26-2 of the In
surance Code makes such coverage compulsory: "Property insurance con
tracts may not exclude the insurer' s cover for damage as a result of terrorist
attacks or bombing perpetrated on the national territory. Any clause to the
1 18
contrary shall be deemed null and void."
This reference to "property in
surance contracts" includes housing insurance

(multirisque habitation) as

well as first party motor-vehicle insurance.
54. Similar coverage has been extended to property damage caused by
industrial disasters. For example, in response to a disaster that occurred on
September 2 1 , 200 1 , when the explosion of a chemical plant called AZF
(owned by Total Fina Elf) located in Toulouse killed thirty people, injured
another 5,000 people, and devastated thousands of private and public build
ings,

1 19

a new act was passed in July 2003 . Under this new act, designated

as Law no. 2003-699 of 30 July 2003,

1 20

first party insurance coverage was

extended to damage caused by industrial catastrophes.
5 5 . In response to the passage of this act, new articles, L. 128- 1 to 1284, were added to the Insurance Code to set the framework of the new
mechanism.
there is a

Under this revision, an official statement must recognize that

"situation of technological catastrophe," as defined in the

117. Law No. 90-509 of 25 July 1 990, Code des assurances, art. L l 22-7. Such coverage may
not be excluded and applies where no declaration of "natural catastrophe" has been made. How
ever, this does not apply where the winds "have reached or exceeded 1 45 kilometers an hour on
average over ten minutes or 2 1 5 kilometers an hour in gusts," in which case compensation is not
due under the contract unless a declaration of "natural catastrophe" has been made.

1 18. C. INS. art. L l26-2, available at http:// 1 95.83.l 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r=

6263 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 19. For further information, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ml 8 1 -82.
1 20. Law No. 03-699 of July 30, 2003.
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1

Only accidents occurring in specific "classified" plants (installa
tions classees ), causing damages to a large number of buildings, are taken
into account.

This applies to first party motor vehicle and housing insur

ance (multirisque habitation).

122

These provisions apply to all victims,

whether they are private persons or businesses. Further, in such cases of a
technological catastrophe, insurance companies are bound to make a com
pensation proposal within three months after the victim asks for compensa
tion or after the official statement declaring the catastrophe.1 2 3 When com
pensation is paid, the insurer is subrogated into the victim's rights for any
.
.
c.
24
tort action agamst a party at 1au lt. 1
56. This new scheme is not meant to cover technological disasters
25
compensation of victims

caused by terrorist attacks. As explained above, 1

covered by first party insurance is compulsory and immediate and does not
depend on an official statement recognizing the catastrophe situation.
However, if there is doubt as to the cause of the catastrophe, it is not un
usual for government authorities to be urged by the media and the
make such recognition, in order to facilitate prompt compensation.

ublic to
1 g6

57. Generally, for uninsured victims, the only way to obtain redress is
to sue the owner of the plant in tort. However, the new law of 2003 allows
the compensation of the uninsured victims of technological catastrophes by
27
This compensation structure resembles solidarity,
a Compensation Fund. 1
8
yet without a positive incentive to self-responsibility . 1 2 Such coverage by
a compensation fund ought to be limited to people living in precarious con
ditions, in order to cover their inexpensive losses. Thus, this limited exam
ple may give a wrong image of the French system. As will be seen, in actu
ality, its complex machinery of shifts and incentives offers a positive
combination of solidarity and self-responsibility.

1 2 1 . C. INS. art. L 1 28- l , available at http:// 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/Jiste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r=
6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).

122. C. INS art. L I 28-2, available at http:/1 1 95.83 . 1 77 .9/code/Jiste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r=

6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
123. Id.

1 24. C. INS art. L l 28-3, available at http:// 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=38&r=
6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 25 . See supra � 55 .
1 26. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 26.
127. Code des assurances, art. L42 1 - 1 6. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 27.
1 28 . Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Compulsory Insurance of Loss to Property

Caused by Natural Disasters:Competition or Solidarity?, WORLD COMPETITION, 2006, at 25, 26,
available at http://amo.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=4663 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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C. SHIFTS AND INCENTIVES

58. The French system of compensation of victims of catastrophes i s
not funded out o f tax revenue but by insurance premiums. With the excep
tion of the compulsory social security system, first party insurance coverage
is not mandatory. People are free to insure their property or not. Except in
1 29
the few cases where uninsured risk is covered by a compensation fund,
only those who insure their risks will benefit from coverage.
59. The main (some would argue maj or) distortion to a purely market
based system i s the compulsory coverage of risks linked to natural and
man-made catastrophes at a regulated price. Under such a system, an addi
tional amount is charged on the premium for every contract insuring prop
erty, such as first-party automobile insurance and homeowner policlo, with
the imposition of an additional amount fixed by State regulation. 1 0 The
only shift in this system is related to technological catastrophes.

S ince

January 1, 2004, an additional €5 is charged per year and per contract; thus,
on the basis of the fifty million contracts existing at present, this means
€250 million is levied every year in anticipation of the coverage of this
1 1
risk. 3 Unlike the case of natural catastrophe, one is more likely to identify
a liable party, and third party insurance might have been a better option.
However, the present system is more protective of victims, since they will
1 32

be covered even when the owners of the defective plants are insolvent.

60. Reinsurance is a big part of the plan. This is provided through the
Caisse centrale de reassurance ("CCR"), an entity acting under govern 
133
Half the premiums levied to cover the consequences of ca
ment control.

tastrophes go to the CCR, which will always cover half the damage insured
and pay for it. With this structure, the CCR is acting as a mutual fund, un
der a very simple 50% rule, which balances the risk of catastrophes among
all insurance companies. This national redistribution of risk is the hallmark

1 29. As in the case of industrial disasters, see supra iJ 60.
1 30. An additional 1 2% is charged on property insurance policies to cover natural catastrophes.
Regarding automobile insurance, there is an additional 6% of the premium covering theft and fire
and 0.5% of premiums relating to damage insurance. For further information, see Moreteau, Can
narsa & F. Lafay, supra note 2, ii 5 1 .
1 3 1 . Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party In surance,
Soc. SCI. RES. NETWORK, Sept. 2007, at 29, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?
abstract_id= l 086036 (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
1 32. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, at 5 1 . Par Ann Michel, Les assureurs vont

faire payer aux particuliers le risque industrie/, LE MONDE (Paris), Sept. 1 0, 2003.
1 33. For additional information about the CCR, see Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note

ii 5 2 .
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The CCR is itself covered by the State,

which provides an unlimited guarantee. In the year 2000, for the first time
in its history, the CCR had to call for the guarantee of the State. This was

due to the combined cost of a drought, severe flooding in the South, and the
two tempests in December 1 999. 1 3 5
6 1 . Another approach to victim compensation that should be men

tioned is an initiative of private insurers. In 2002, the French insurance in

dustry created a pool called GAREAT

(Gestion de / 'assurance et de la re
assurancedes risquesattentats et actes de terrorisme) , to reinsure damage to

property caused by terrorist attacks. 1

36

The Pool GAREA T covers enter

prises, local authorities, large buildings such as hospitals, and technological
1
risk where the insured capital exceeds €6 million. 3 7 The system is organ

ized in layers. The CCR appears at the third and fourth layers, with unlim

ited state coverage through the CCR. Some may argue that the state offers

reinsurance without charging premiums. However, the state contribution is

meant to be a security or guarantee. The CCR always remains the principal

debtor.

62. Such an effort demonstrates that despite state intervention, the pri

vate sector remains a primary actor and continues to operate on a free com

petition basis. In essence, the state steps in to facilitate the coverage of the
very large risk by pooling private money. In doing so, the state affords a

financial guarantee to a privately capitalized system. Ex post state interven

tion is limited to fixing the public infrastructure, which is usually done in a
quick and efficient way.

63 . Incentives to promote self-responsibility have been developed at

1 34. The CCR also acts as a reinsurer for the French insurance companies; a victim may not
call directly on the CCR. The CCR also protects insurance companies for the share they them
selves are supposed to cover, through a stop-loss system. See Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra
note 2, � 52.
1 3 5 . For a historical description ofthe CCR including references to the unprecedented events of
the year 2000, see CAISSE CENTRALE DE REASSURANCE, LES CATASTROPHES NATURELLES EN
FRANCE: NATURAL DISASTERS IN FRANCE 1 9, 24-26 (2005), available at http://www.ccr.fr/fr/pdf/
catnat_2005 .pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
1 36. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, � 53.
1 37. For a comprehensive description of the system, see GAREAT, Documentation,
http://www.gareat.com/gareat/rtaccueil.nsf/documentation?Openpage; ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN,

INSTITUTE VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT, REPORT NO. 3: FINANCIAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE, § Commercial Terrorism Insurance in France (GAREAT), available at
http://www .institut.veolia.org/en/cahiers/protection-insurability-terrorism/analysis-partnership/ter
rorism-france.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). For an update on GAREAT in 2007, see Lloyd's
Worldwide, France: GAREAT in 2007, http://www.lloyds.com/Lloyds_Worldwide/International_
compliance_news/France_GAREAT_in_2007.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
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Examples can be found i n relation to technological risks

and natural catastrophes. In regards to technological risks, the law of July
2003 created some exclusion zones around the high risk areas.

Article

L 128-4 of the Insurance Code introduces a limitation to the insurance cov

erage that was made compulsory by the new law of 3 0 July 2003 when the
existence of a technological catastrophe has been officially recognized.
Under this limitation, insurance coverage is excluded for all buildings
erected in special areas recognized in a prevention plan of technological
risks (plan de prevention des risquestechnologiques) as causing a serious
138
risk to human life,
if erected in such an area after the plan has been pub
lished.

Insurance coverage is also excluded for buildings erected in viola

tion of administrative rules when the purpose of such rules is to prevent
139
damages caused by a technological catastrophe.
This creates a clear in
centive not to build in these special danger zones, where expropriation may
be exercised, or to comply with protective administrative rules.

When no

expropriation has been exercised, insurance coverage in the special zones
will only be granted to buildings existing before the publication of the plan.
Further, when expropriation appears to be the only reasonable solution,
fifty-percent of the compensation is paid for by state funds, and the other
1 40
fifty-percent is paid for by local industry.
64. When a disaster is declared a "natural catastrophe," the insured

must bear a share of the loss, which remains uninsured (deductible or .fran
141
chise). The amount of the deductible is fixed by the State.
In municipali
ties not having adopted a "prevention of risk plan" (plan de prevention des

risques), the deductible gets higher every time there is a declaration of natu
ral catastrophe: twice as much the third time, three times as much the fourth
1 42
time, and four times as much any additional times.
This creates an incen
tive for the local population to press the municipality to adopt a prevention
plan or to relocate to safer areas.
IV. CONCLUSION
65. A careful study of the law and practice related to catastrophes

shows that solidarity, public or private, always exists after a catastrophic
event.

In fact, such responses have even been described as excessive (by

1 38. See C. ENV'T arts. LS l 5- 1 5 to 26 (especially note art. L5 l 5 - l 6).

1 39. C. INS. art. L l 28-4 1 2, available at http:// 1 95.83 . 1 77.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=
38&r=6265 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
1 40. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 1 68.

1 4 1 . C. INS. art. L l 25-2, , 2, L l 25-3, 11 2, A l 25 - l annex II. See also Moreteau, Cannarsa &
Lafay, supra note 2, 1 67.
1 42. Moreteau, Cannarsa & Lafay, supra note 2, 1 67.
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comparison to other urgent, legitimate, and unsatisfied needs) after large
scale catastrophes such as the South Asia Tsunami of December 26, 2004
where some charities finally declared that they could no longer accept gifts
for that purpose. However, nobody would question the shifts and distor
tions to market rules where public money is spent in sometimes huge
amounts after the event. In such cases, reason seems to be trumped by
emotion.
66. Yet,

ex post state funding is raising major concerns that are not

addressed in this Article. For instance, in Louisiana, the post Katrina and
Rita question comes up repeatedly: "Where does the money go?" The
ghost of corruption continues to linger.

67. Solidarity may be organized ex ante, combining self
responsibility, the resort to market forces, and state intervention. This
cocktail is familiar even in the United States. True, the mix is not the same
in Jacobin France and decentralized America, but careful analysis shows
that it would be wrong to believe that there is always more state interven
tion and public money spent in France than in the United States of America.
The French tend to regulate insurance premiums but leave the onus on the
insured, the state offering a financial guarantee behind a strong and healthy
reinsurance system. 1 43 In contrast, Americans do not interfere with premi
ums, but are more willing to inject public money directly where the levied
premiums do not suffice.
68. It is clear that prevention and solidarity must combine individual

and collective action. 1 44 In every place where large-scale disasters have oc
curred, market forces alone were never sufficient to entirely fix the prob
lems. But, when properly combined, solidarity and self-responsibility ap
pear to be the most desirable and respectable social values, justifying some
distortion to competition rules. Law and economics scholars usually reject

such views, and yet Roger Van den Bergh and Michael Faure find that effi
ciency and solidarity may legitimize compulsory insurance coverage of loss
of property caused by natural disasters: " [R]estrictions of competition may
be presented as the price to pay for guaranteeing that victims of catastro
45 Such solutions should be on the
phes are appropriately compensated." 1

143. On the financial health of the French Caisse centrale de reassurance, see Morete au, Can
narsa & Lafay, supra note 2, ii 52.
144. For

an

alternative view, b asing the response on

an

international social insurance system,

with a fund managed by the World Bank or under its control, see Jef Van Langendonck, Interna
tional Socia/ Insurance for National Disasters?, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 1 83 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007).

145 .Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 8 1 , iJ 51 (concluding that the French model, which has
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agenda of every political ticket instead of solutions merely aimed at satisfy
ing particular pri vate interest groups. Comparative studies are useful in a
world more and more prone to destructive disasters. Such studies show that
there is no mirac le recipe by highlighting that ad hoc and

ex

post solutions

are less efficient and cause more distortions, and concluding that sound
prevention lies in the art of mastering the mix of solidarity and self
responsibility.

69. This Article has addressed the issues of compensation and, to
some extent, prevention. But there is much more to be done to that effect.
Global warming is still denied by some, who do not want their activity to be
identified as a cause.

Political action is limited by the short horizon of re

election. Part of the answer may be in collective action. But the engine to
progress also lies in the individual. Why not sue politicians, private com
panies, and their directors for making our p lanet an unlivable world for the
generations to come? The law can be used for purposes going far beyond
the satisfaction of selfish interests. Instead, it can also be a weapon to fight
man-made disasters and protect our individual and collective future.

been followed by a significant number of countries not covered in the present study, may
benefit from a solidarity exception).

